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Debt-for-Nature: The Second Generation
By KONRAD VON MOLTKE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Developments in international environmental affairs are occurring
with extraordinary speed. It is difficult to recall that the Montreal Proto-
col on Substances that Deplete the Stratospheric Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol) was signed only three years ago, and entered into force on Jan-
uary 1, 1990.1 The Montreal Protocol was amended significantly in June
1990 to phase out worldwide an entire group of important industrial
chemicals which produce the chlorofluorocarbons that are most damag-
ing to the stratospheric ozone layer.2 Moreover, a fund was established
to help less developed countries (LDCs) switch to chloroflourocarbon al-
ternatives, thus facilitating their adjustment to the requirements of the
amendment.3 This in turn gave the needed impetus for the creation of a
Global Environmental Facility (Green Fund) within the World Bank in
November 1990. 4
Similarly, the preparations have continued for an international con-
vention on climate change, which will be ready for signature in June
1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.5 The details of this effort remain unclear,
even though the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change submitted
its first assessment report,6 and the World Climate Conference met in
* Adjunct Professor of Environmental Studies, Dartmouth College; Senior Fellow,
World Wildlife Fund and The Conservation Foundation; Ph.D. 1967, University of Gttingen,
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1. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature
Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY Doc. 10, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 LLM. 1550
(1987) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
2. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
3. Id See also UNEP NORTH AMERICA NEWS, Aug. 1990, at 1; Parties to Montreal
Protocol Argue to Phase Out CFCs Help Developing Nations, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 275,
275-76 (1990).
4. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
5. Stabilization of Greenhouse Gases Called for in Draft Ministerial Document, 13 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 456 (1990) [hereinafter Stabilization of Greenhouse Gases].
6. Summary Conclusions, 3 INT'L ENVTL. AFr. - (1991) (in press).
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Geneva in late October 1990.7 Arguably, negotiating this regime to gov-
ern global climate change is the most important task facing the interna-
tional community at present, as it will have implications for social and
economic conditions far into the next century which promise to reach
into almost every household on the planet.'
Next to these global concerns, topics which were the focus of atten-
tion a few years ago such as regional developments on acid rain in Cen-
tral Europe, or regional seas and fisheries have receded into the
background. Even a dramatic development in Brazil, arguably the most
significant event in international environmental policy in 1990, has gone
largely unnoticed: Brazil has shifted from a policy of exploiting the Am-
azon to one of seeking sustainable patterns of use." While the ultimate
results of this policy shift remain to be seen, Brazil has already become a
major actor in international environmental negotiations since its Amazo-
nian liability has been limited.
This flurry of activity has not occurred in isolation. The linkages
between international environmental management and international fi-
nance and trade are becoming increasingly apparent: development the-
ory and practice, structural adjustment, trade, national accounting, and
international finance are all being reconsidered in the light of environ-
mental imperatives. Debt-for-nature programs are part of this broader
process. Indeed, they have been one of the engines of change.
There are several variations of the debt-for-nature swap. 10 Gener-
ally, a bank exchanges part of the debt of a LDC for that country's bonds
or currency, which the bank sells or donates to an environmental conser-
vation organization.1" In some swaps, the conservation organization uses
the bonds or currency to promote conservation or wildlife preservation in
the debtor LDC. 12 Alternatively, the bank sells or donates the debt di-
rectly to the conservation organization which forgives the debt in return
for environmental concessions.' 3 Consent of the debtor LDC must be
7. Stabilization of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 5, at 456; U.S., Western Europe Reach
Compromise on Dealing with Greenhouse Effect Gases, 13 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 479 (1990),
8. von Moltke, Rigimes for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in LIMITING THE
GREENHOUSE EFFECr: OPTIONS FOR CONTROLLING ATMOSPHERIC CO2 ACCUMULATION
(G. Pearman ed.) (in press).
9. Recent Developments, Environmental Law: Brazil Enacts New Protections for the Am-
azon Rain Forest, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 503-13 (1989).
10. See Sadler, Debt-For-Nature Swaps: Assessing the Future, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL'Y 319, 321 (1990).
11. See id. at 320.
12. Dionne, Treasury Agrees to Construe Revenue Ruling on .Debt-for-Nature Swaps Liber-
ally, 39 TAx NoTs 307 (1988) (discussing deductibility of donations).
13. See Sadler, supra note 10, at 320-21.
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obtained before the initial sale or donation. 4
When the chosen conservation or preservation project entails con-
tinuing ownership of land or management of a trust fund by an environ-
mental conservation organization, the organization which negotiated the
swap sometimes enlists the aid of a second conservation organization
from the debtor nation. The first organization transfers its interests in
the debt to the second. This avoids disputes with LDCs which are disin-
clined to allow foreign ownership of land or foreign interference in man-
agement of government-owned parks and preserves."
Debt-for-nature programs rest on a deceptively simple notion: the
negotiation of reductions in the debt of an LDC in return for increased
conservation efforts on its part. Unless closely observed and carefully
negotiated, debt-for-nature swaps appear to be a sleight of hand: the
turning of a liability into an asset. Over the past three years, however,
they have become an accepted part of conservation funding. 6
When originally proposed, debt-for-nature swaps seemed to be a
strange idea indeed. By late 1990 however, at least fifteen programs had
been concluded, for a total payout to conservation organizations in
LDCs of more than one hundred million dollars in funds and bonds.
17
Most of these initial swaps were undertaken by private organizations
with the concurrence of the debtor country's government. Others were
funded by the governments of developed nations, and were modeled on
the private swaps.'
8
The achievement of private organizations in providing debt-for-na-
ture transactions should not be underestimated. In every instance, com-
plex negotiations must be held between conservation organizations in the
debtor and the creditor nations, governmental agencies in the debtor
country, and creditor banks. These negotiations require extraordinary
resources and institutional capabilities. At the end of the negotiations,
conservation organizations must fund the transactions with money gen-
14. Id. at 321.
15. See id. at 320-21; see also Debt-for-Nature Swaps Made Elsewhere in Latin America
Said Unfeasible in Mexico, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 408 (1988).
16. See European Conference on Debt and Conservation November 2-3, 1989, 2 INTIL
ENvT. AFF. 130, 130-86 (1990) [hereinafter European Conference].
17. World Wildlife Fund, Officially Sanctioned Debt for Nature Swaps (Mar. 1991)
(available from the World Wildlife Fund, 1250 Twenty-Fourth St., NW, Washington, D.C.
20037).
18. The governments of Sweden and the Netherlands funded swaps in Costa Rica; the
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) funded a program in Madagascar.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
erated from donations. 9
This leveraging generates more money than has ever been available
for conservation in LDCs. Nevertheless, as significant these efforts may
be, they do not represent the full potential of debt-for-nature swaps. The
transactions to date have demonstrated the linkage between conservation
and international economic and financial relations. They will ultimately
have a place in intergovernmental relations and point the way towards
cooperative ventures between governments, based on the creative use of
the debt crisis. Part III of this Article will examine the prospects for this
second generation of debt-for-nature programs, and will particularly em-
phasize the recent Enterprise Initiative for the Americas as a model.
Other linkages between conservation and international economic re-
lations are less obvious. Yet, there are a number of emerging and poten-
tial international economic tools used by developed nations to foster
incentives for environmental protection in LDCs. These policies relate to
debt management, trade, subsidies, and resource valuation. They do not
always produce the best environmental effects, however, and are gener-
ally not utilized to their full potential. A number of these issues will be
studied in Part II for illustrative purposes.
II. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
AFFECTING CONSERVATION EFFORTS
A. LDC Debt Management
The introduction of debt-for-nature programs in several developing
countries has served to focus attention on the wider prospects of debt and
conservation linkage.20 Nevertheless, the precise dynamics of debt serv-
icing and debt reduction, and their potential impact on natural resources
in LDCs, has not yet been assessed.
At a superficial level, the coincidence of debt and tropical forest con-
servation is fairly obvious: many of the most indebted countries also
have exceptionally high rates of deforestation.21 The absolute magni-
tude of debt alone, however, is a poor inducement of conservation meas-
ures. It is the combination of debt in proportion to a nation's Gross
19. von Moltke, Negotiating in the Global Arena: Debt-for-Nature Swaps, RESOLVE (No.
22) 1, 3 (1990).
20. See generally European Conference, supra note 16.
21. Brazil has a total debt of over 111 billion dollars, SrATISTICAL Y.B. FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN at 766, U.N. Doc. E/CEPAL/Z/Ser. A/13, U.N. Sales No,
E/S.90.II.G.1 (1989), and had an annual deforestation rate of 2323 hectares as of 1988,
WORLD RESOURCES INST., INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T & DEv. IN COLLABORATION WITH
UNEP, WORLD RESOURCES, 1988-89, at 286 (1988).
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Domestic Product (GDP), and of deteriorating terms of trade for an
LDC's traditional products, which creates a strong incentive for conser-
vation as one of the few available sources of additional income.
Due to the economic imbalance created by overwhelming levels of
debt, LDCs often adopt short-term economic policies designed to meet
their next interest or principal payment. Since the benefits of environ-
mental conservation are typically long-term in nature, they tend to be
disregarded in favor of the short-term interests of debt servicing and of
feeding and housing a growing population.
The extraordinary imbalances created by such debt management
can be illustrated in a number of ways. Perhaps the most dramatic ex-
ample is the widespread phenomenon of net resource flows from LDCs
to the developed countries within the Organization of Economic Cooper-
ation and Development. 2 This phenomenon is contrary to fundamental
principles of economic management, and represents a major breakdown
in the international financial system.23 Many factors have contributed to
this breakdown, among them the accumulation of excessive debt by
LDCs in the 1970s, the rapid creation of worldwide markets in which
economically less efficient systems were at a distinct disadvantage, and
the continued imbalance of payments of the world's largest economy.24
In the past few years, efforts to rectify the breakdown have tended to
focus mainly on the policies of the debtor countries, and not on those of
the creditors. While this is economically acceptable, it is doubtful that it
is politically prudent.
In an attempt to rectify the general economic distortions resulting
from unsustainable levels of debt, which in turn encourage the harvesting
of tropical forests, a number of specific debt management agreements
have been developed at the international level. The most important of
these are the International Monetary Fund's25 structural adjustment pro-
grams and restructuring agreements between debtor countries and com-
mercial banks.26 Thus far, however, these schemes have not given
adequate consideration to the issue of conservation.
22. Schmidt, Facing One World- A Report by an Independent Group on Financial Flows to
Developing Countries, 2 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 174, 174-81 (1990).
23. Id
24. See id at 175.
25. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T.
2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937. The International Monetary Fund was conceived at the Bretton
Woods Conference of July 1944.
26. See generally Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT .L 1, 1-154
(1984).
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B. Trade Protection
The rapid growth of worldwide markets has created both opportuni-
ties and disruption for the economies of developing nations. This growth
has been fostered by a sustained global drive towards greater free trade
and open financial markets. While markets may remain largely unregu-
lated by lack of formal international agreement, free trade is the result of
a conscious policy of trade liberalization achieved through bilateral nego-
tiations and the multilateral framework of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).27
The GATT is primarily a negotiating forum rather than an interna-
tional organization, since the Havana Charter,2" which was to establish
an International Trade Organization as the final element of the Bretton
Woods structure, was signed but never ratified by the United States.
Consequently, GATT was created with the express purpose of forming a
legal forum which could be approved by executive agreements, that is,
without the consent of the U.S. Senate. The GATT is thus a weak insti-
tution with no executive authority.29 Implementation of GATT provi-
sions occurs primarily through the Conference of Parties or in the
domestic courts of the parties.
The GATT has established rules governing trade between its parties.
At the heart of this system is the principle of most favored nation (MFN)
status, whereby no country is given special trading advantages which are
not available to all MFN countries.30 In the initial phase of GATT, and
through the Kennedy Round of the early 1960s, the parties' focus was on
lowering tariffs. Since then, attention has shifted to nontariff barriers to
trade (NTBs), among which environmental criteria may figure. The pre-
ferred approach to eradicating NTBs is their conversion into tariffs, and
the subsequent phased reduction in these tariffs.
Until recently, the GATT focused on trade barriers to manufac-
tured goods. The Uruguay Round was to facilitate the inclusion of agri-
cultural products and services under the GATT umbrella.31  The
27. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfiir signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
28. The Havana Charter never entered into force, mostly because of opposition by the
United States. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION: ANNOTATED BASIC
DOCUMENTS AND DESCRIPTIVE DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND Al-
RANGEMENTS, Dir. I.B.2.1, at 1.
29. Id. at 2.
30. i
31. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Sept. 20, 1986, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1623 (1986).
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inevitable important environmental implications of this policy have not
been addressed.
The GATT regime could not be applied in an undifferentiated man-
ner to all countries. Consequently, provisions were introduced allowing
the creation of regional areas of greater free trade, such as the European
Community or the United States and Canada, which permit preferential
treatment of imports from certain LDCs. The most important of these
preferential systems are the Lom6 Accords between the European Com-
munity and a group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) coun-
tries,32 and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
33
Since GATT is not a free trade regime, but a process for reducing
trade barriers, the option facing GATT negotiators is not, as is often
stated, a choice between free trade or trade barriers. Rather, it is a
choice between acceptable and unacceptable barriers. Thus, the trade
regulations which may be essential to achieve environmental conserva-
tion in LDCs, either as leverage or as incentive, can be entirely consistent
with GATT.
Important precedent exists for the use of trade restrictions as an
instrument to enforce environmental policies. The Washington Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species 34 (CITES) is one ex-
ample. The Montreal Protocol clearly envisions the use of trade
restrictions as a means of ensuring compliance with its provisions." A
ruling was obtained from the GATT Secretariat that these provisions
were acceptable under article XX, which concerns measures for public
health and safety.36 The use of trade regulation as a means of conserva-
tion is, however, a risky undertaking. Trade protection is, however, justi-
fiable in protecting the subsistence sector of an LDC's economy while the
32. Fourth African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community Con-
vention [ACP-EEC] [Lom6 IV], done Dec. 15, 1989, reprinted in 29 LLM. 809 (1990); Third
ACP-EEC Convention [Lom6 III], done Dec. 8, 1984, reprinted in 24 LLM. 571 (1985); Sec-
ond ACP-EEC Convention [Lom6 II], done Oct. 31, 1979, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980);
1975 ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6 [Lom6 I], done Feb. 28, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.LM. 595
(1975).
33. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, tit. V, 88 Stat. 1978, 2066-71 (1974) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1988)).
34. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, art. II, para 4, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 1092, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 246
(stating that: "the Parties shall not allow trade in specimens of (specified species] except in
accordance with the provisions of the present Convention.").
35. Montreal Protocol, supra note 1, art. 4, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. at 1554-55.
36. Personal communication with Ambassador Richard Benedick, U.S. Chief Negotiator
for the Montreal Protocol (Nov. 1990). The Montreal Protocol trade restrictions have not,
however, been fully defined thus far.
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long-term problems of marketing goods and protecting the environment
are solved.
The major risk of trade protection is the creation of nonbeneficial
economic structures which tend to perpetuate themselves. The ultimate
result is higher consumer prices and lower levels of production. The
irony is that the goal of trade regulation is to benefit conservation by
raising prices to consumers, thus depressing total consumption. In nor-
mally functioning markets, however, production rises in response to the
stimulus of higher prices.
In essence, the result of trade regulation for conservation is the crea-
tion of cartels, with all the attendant economic distortions and little like-
lihood of achieving long-term viability; long-term viability is an essential
criterion for a nation's economic success. Thus, many complex issues
remain to be resolved in regard to trade regulation and conservation.
The fact that the goals of conservation are laudable does not alleviate the
negative economic implications of trade regulation. These implications
cause those concerned primarily with economic policy to resist strongly
any attempt to manipulate the international trade system to achieve envi-
ronmental goals.
C. Subsidies
The GATT seeks to limit, and eventually to eliminate, market sub-
sidies, both as a tool of trade policy and of economic policy. This is
because subsidies increasingly distort international competition as more
goods are traded internationally. The adverse economic impacts of sub-
sidies are particularly severe in a long-term perspective; the environmen-
tal perspective must necessarily be long-term. Economic theory holds
that negative impacts magnify with the passage of time; subsidies are
granted in the short-term, so that longer term impacts are subject to
compounded interest calculations.
A number of subsidies have recently emerged which are of particu-
lar significance to conservation. Among them are subsidies for restraint
in pesticide use, timber extraction, and water pricing.37
The issue of subsidies is particularly complex in the environmental
arena. Many countries use subsidies only for certain remedial actions,
whereas other nations employ subsidies to accelerate environmental com-
pliance. Exemplary use of subsidies has been made in the European
37. H. P. BINSWANGER, FISCAL AND LEGAL INCENTIVES WITH ENVIRONMENTAL EF-
FECTS ON THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON (1987).
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Community." In any subsidy program, economic tools are used to
counterbalance the inelasticity of the legal system, which results from the
slowness of legal processes or from the fact that, in some countries,
changes in permit requirements are considered a governmental taking.
The essential lesson which has emerged from the protracted debate in the
European Community concerning subsidies for environmental purposes
is that these economic incentives must be limited in time and strictly
limited in volume. They must be viewed as tools to facilitate the transi-
tion to more sustainable practices.
Subsidies are, however, clearly contrary to the "polluter pays" prin-
ciple, whereby the costs of environmental degradation are properly allo-
cated. When properly applied, these allocations will always lead to an
increase in consumer prices, and hence a reduction in total consumption,
since the ultimate "polluter" is the consumer of natural resources. In-
creasingly, however, there is a lack of appropriate mechanisms to ensure
that all environmental costs associated with a product are internalized
and passed on to its users. The ultimate result is a form of distorting




Raw resources have no market value apart from the price of the
land on which they are located, provided that land ownership conveys
control over all resources. Indeed, frequently the land may be valued
more highly than whatever resources are on it, creating incentives to re-
move them as an obstacle to development. In the absence of an identifi-
able market valuation, such natural resources have been economically
invisible, creating strong disincentives for conservation.
A recent study reassessed Indonesia's basic economic indicators in
light of the ultimate impact of deforestation, oil depletion, and soil ero-
sion, thus assigning a concrete value to these resources.40 Indonesia
presents a successful example of development policy. A recent study re-
vised Indonesian national accounts from 1971 to 1984 to take into con-
sideration the three conservation factors mentioned above. The result
38. Rehbinder & Stewart, Environmental Protection, in 2 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW:
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe & J.
Weiler eds. 1985).
39. See generally M. KosMo, MONEY TO BURN? THE HIGH COSTS OF ENERGY SUBSI-
DIES (1987).
40. Repetto, Balance Sheet Erosion: How to Account for the Loss of Natural Resources, 1
INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 103-37 (1989).
19911
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
was that the annual growth of GDP proved to be 4.0 percent rather than
the previous calculation of 7.1 percent.4 ' Similarly, the calculation of the
average growth of gross domestic investment fell from 11.4 to 1.3 percent
according to this reassessment.42
These figures make good intuitive sense since resources in place are
assimilated to the capital stock of a country; hence, unsustainable harvest
is a form of disinvestment. On the other hand, protection of these re-
sources is equivalent to maintaining the capital base of a country, which
has important beneficial effects on its credit standing and long-term eco-
nomic viability. The recognition of resource valuation in the interna-
tional economic arena would thus encourage conservation of resources as
valuable commodities.
I. SOVEREIGN DEBT-FOR-NATURE
None of these linkages between conservation and international eco-
nomic relations is self-evident. All require complex trade-offs between
sometimes arcane, or seemingly arcane, matters. They are not designed
to catch the attention of major policymakers who require a concise, fo-
cussed, exposition of issues. Debt-for-nature programs, on the other
hand, have the needed characteristics to make them readily comprehensi-
ble at all levels of policymaking. They appear simple, though in practice
they require extremely complex operations. Consequently, debt-for-na-
ture programs have received a remarkable level of -political commitment.
The U.S. President and the heads of state and government of the G-7
industrialized countries, as well as individual heads of government, have
at various times indicated their willingness to undertake debt-for-nature
swaps. Both the Paris and the Houston Summits referred positively to
the potential of debt-for-nature conversions.43 Debt-for-nature swaps
based on sovereign debt conversions has recently been the focus of two
West German transactions" and of the Enterprise Initiative for the
Americas, launched by President Bush in advance of his recent trip to
Latin America.45
41. Id. at 133.
42. Id at 134. The author excluded 1971 since the strongly positive resource flow in the
first year influences the result. If 1971 was included, net domestic investment would show an
average annual decrease of 3.6%.
43. Paris Economic Declaration: "In special cases, ODA [official development aid] debt
forgiveness and debt-for-nature swaps can play a useful role in environmental protection."
Houston Economic Declaration, item 72: "We recognize that debt-for-nature swaps can play a
useful role in protecting the environment."
44. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
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The issues involved in using sovereign debt conversions for conser-
vation are quite different than those involved in private transactions. In
private transactions, only one government is necessarily involved: that of
the debtor country. In sovereign debt transactions, at least two govern-
ments will be involved since the creditor is now also a sovereign govern-
ment, and a convergence of interests must be achieved for both of these
governments.
Sovereign creditors have found the Paris Club to be a forum in
which issues of debt and debt management are coordinated. The Paris
Club also serves the same purpose achieved in renegotiation of private
debts by par passu clauses: it ensures that no single creditor country
undertakes steps for its own benefit at the expense of other creditors.
Thus, an essential precondition for sovereign debt transactions is to ob-
tain a Paris Club agreement for sovereign debt conversions. This was
achieved in late 1990 through a passage recorded in the minutes of the El
Salvador restructuring agreement:
On a voluntary basis, the Government of each creditor country or its
appropriate institutions may sell or exchange, in the framework of debt
for nature, debt for aid, debt for equity swaps, or other local currency
debt swaps:
(1) the amounts of outstanding loans... as regards official develop-
ment aid loans and direct government loans, [and]
(2) the amounts of other outstanding credits... up to 10% of the
amounts of outstanding claims as of August 31, 1990 or up to an
amount of 10 million U.S. dollars, whichever is higher.
46
The use of such language in the debt restructuring of other lower middle
income countries will open the door for a systematic approach to sover-
eign debt-for-nature conversions. The West German government indi-
cated more than two years ago that it planned to forgive Kenyan debt in
exchange for conservation, but no agreement has been announced, and
the negotiations appear to have advanced haltingly, possibly because of
"Paris Club" complications. 47 Another effort was undertaken by the
German government in connection with a loan to Poland, which did not
follow "Paris Club" rules, since it was part of an initial package of agree-
46. Agreed Minute on the Consolidation of the Debt of the Republic of El Salvador, Sept.
17, 1990 (available from the World Wildlife Fund, 1250 Twenty-fourth SL, NW, Washington,
D.C. 20037).
47. Only anecdotal information is available. The project followed commissioning of a
study on debt-for-nature by the federal Chancellory. Oberndbrfer, Schutz der tropischen
Regenwdlder durch Entschuldung, in 5 PERSPEKTIV.N UND ORIENTIfERUNEN (1989).
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ments between the German and Polish governments in 197 1,48 and not a
form of development aid. This debt has recently been forgiven, but the
conditions are not widely known yet. During the negotiations, conserva-
tion was under consideration as one element of the Polish quid pro quo
(support for German language teaching in Polish schools and protection
of sites related to the German resistance against National Socialism being
the others).49
Enterprise Initiative for the Americas
The major current initiative in the area of sovereign debt-for-nature
programs is the U.S. Enterprise Initiative for the Americas (the Initia-
tive).5" As proposed on June 27, 1990, by President Bush, the Initiative
pursues three major goals: (1) to establish free and fair trade rules with
individual Latin American countries; (2) to help introduce major invest-
ment reforms, including the privatization of state-owned companies and
the liberalization of investment regimes; and (3) to permit partial debt
reduction of various types of loans for eligible countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean.51
Eligibility for debt reduction under the proposal would be depen-
dent on the debtor nation's performance under four variables: (1) an
economic reform program approved by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), in practice a structural adjustment program; (2) structural or
sectoral loans under the World Bank or International Development As-
sociation (IDA); (3) measures in the areas of trade and investment out-
lined by the Initiative; and (4) satisfactory agreements with commercial
banks.52 The United States would reduce the loan principal of eligible
countries and permit interest to be paid into a local currency trust fund
at a concessionary rate.53 If the debtor country has reached an environ-
mental agreement with the United States establishing an environmental
fund, the interest payments would be made in local rather than U.S. cur-
rency. The environmental fund would be disbursed for environmental
48. Personal communication with Justus von Widukind, Coordinator of the Global Chal.
lenges Network, in Munich (1989).
49. Id.
50. Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1009 (July 2, 1990).
51. Id. at 1009-13.
52. White House Fact Sheet on the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Act of 1990, 26





programs.- The proposed Initiative would include all sovereign debt. 55
It also would provide for the sale, reduction, or cancellation of some
quasi-government loans from the Export-Import Bank 56 and assets
aquired as a result of credit guarantees by the Commercial Commodity
Corporation (CCC), so long as they are used for debt-for-equity and
debt-for-nature programs.57 These sales, reductions, or cancellations of
Export-Import Bank loans or CCC assets would only be done in connec-
tion with satisfactory plans for debt-for-equity and debt-for-nature
swaps.
58
The Initiative clearly demonstrates how the wide range of interna-
tional economic and financial policy issues can be interrelated and
brought into focus by debt-for-nature programs. The challenge
presented to environmental interests following President Bush's an-
nouncement was to identify the environmental consequences of the
nondebt elements of the Initiative (trade, investment, and restructuring),
and to balance the environmental advantages and disadvantages of the
entire packet. Some organizations clearly concluded that the Initiative
offers sufficient advantages to make the program as a whole attractive,59
or at least worth considering, as the Initiative required congressional ap-
proval before it could be implemented.
Of the sections of the Initiative which required congressional action,
only the provisions for PL 480 loans passed in the 101st Congress.' PL
480 debts total about 1.7 billion dollars in Latin America.61 The passage
of this portion does, however, establish the institutional mechanisms and
lays out the principles to be applied to sovereign debt reduction programs
on a larger scale. Under the legislation, eligible countries can have their
54. Id at 1373-74.
55. Id at 1373.
56. Export-Import Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-173, 59 Stat. 526-29 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 635-635t (1988)). White House Fact Sheet, supra note 52, at 1374.
57. These assets were acquired as a result of credit guarantees made in connection with
export sales under programs authorized pursuant to the Commodity Credit Corporation Char-
ter Act, Pub. L. No. 80-806, 62 Stat. 1070-75 (1948) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-
714p (1988)) and Section 4(b) of the Food for Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 95-501, § 4(b), 92 Stat.
1685-86 (1978) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1707a (1988)). White House Fact Sheet,
supra note 52, at 1374.
58. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 52, at 1374.
59. See Passell, Washington Offers Mountain of Debt to Save Forests, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22,
1991, at Cl, col. 4, C9, cols. 5-6.
60. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104
Stat. 3359, 3658-62 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1738(a)-(m)).
61. World Wildlife Fund, Congressional Debt Owed to U.S. Government as of December
1989 (Latin America and the Carribean) (available from the World Wildlife Fund, 1250
Twenty-Fourth St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20037).
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PL 480 debt reduced (perhaps by as much as fifty to sixty percent), while
interest on the remaining debt is channelled in local currency into an
environmental fund administered by a local panel.62 According to the
legislation, this panel will include the following representatives: one or
more individuals appointed by the President; one or more individuals
appointed by the government of the beneficiary country; and nationals of
the beneficiary country who represent a broad range of nongovernmental
organizations active in conservation, community development, and scien-
tific or academic organizations.63 This last category will form a majority
on each panel.64
The legislation differs in two significant ways from the original pro-
posal. The eligibility conditions are weakened in exceptional circum-
stances to allow countries which are making "significant progress"
toward putting in place IMF standby adjustment loans, and moving to a
more open investment regime, to qualify for the program.'5 Second, a
public-private Enterprise for the Americas Board (Board) will be estab-
lished in the United States to oversee the development of guidelines for
the implementation of the program in participating countries.66 The
Board will be comprised of five U.S. government representatives and four
"private, non-governmental, environmental, scientific and academic or-
ganizations with experience and expertise" in the region.67 The Board
was created to allay congressional concerns for adequate accountability.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 102d Congress will almost certainly need to address the Enter-
prise for the Americas Initiative generally, and its debt-for-nature com-
ponent in particular. Now that precedent setting decisions have been
made, it is possible to implement some sovereign debt-for-nature pro-
grams. Clearly, choosing an appropriate debtor nation is a crucial first
step, and several Caribbean and Central American countries are cur-
rently under consideration.
It is perhaps premature to declare a new era of sovereign debt con-
versions. Too many problems remain to be resolved. However, the abil-
ity of implementors of this second generation of debt-for-nature
62. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101.624, 104
Stat. 3359, 3658-62 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1738(a)-(m)).
63. Id. at 3660.
64. Id
65. See id. at 3658.




programs to successfully conclude a significant number of transactions in
the absence of a formalized framework suggests that most of the out-
standing issues will soon be resolved. Whether other countries will fol-
low the path developed primarily by U.S. environmental organizations
remains to be seen.
The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative indicates above all, how-
ever, that it will be increasingly difficult to disassociate the issues of con-
servation and international economic management. Whatever the results
of the Initiative, the world economy is entering a phase where debt,
trade, development assistance, structural adjustment, and technology
transfer will all be reviewed and adjusted in light of the environmental
imperative. Debt-for-nature programs historically represent the first
practical step in this process, and may yet continue to provide an impor-
tant focus for further developments.

